The Fall of the USSR 1985-91

Question 1

Overview of Interpretation 1: Economic weaknesses and the failure of Gorbachev’s economic reforms

Answer 1

Some historians argue that the USSR collapsed due to its economic weaknesses. There are 3 variations of this argument:

1. Some historians believe that the economic problems can be traced back to the mid-1920s and Stalin’s introductions of Collectivisation and the Five Year Plans, creating a ‘command economy’ whereby all is controlled by the government. They argue that this style have innate weaknesses and are fundamentally inefficient, and that in the long run a free market always outperforms, seen where economic growth slowed in the 50s and stagnated under Khrushchev.
2. Other historians argue that command economies work, and it was Gorbachev’s economic reforms and mismanagement that plunged the economy into unnecessary chaos by undermining the command economy without fully embracing the free market.
3. Some historians synthesise arguments 1&2, suggesting that the innate weaknesses of the command economy were exacerbated by Gorbachev’s flawed reforms, speeding up the process of collapse.

Question 2

Overview of Interpretation 2: Political problems and the failure of Gorbachev’s political reforms

Answer 2

Some historians argue that the collapse was primarily due to political issues. There are 2 variations to this argument:

1. Some historians believe that the political system was damaged beyond repair when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, and highlight the unrepresentative nature of the system established by Lenin, Stalin’s abuses of power, Khrushchev’s chaotic changes and the stagnation that occurred under B, A&C that caused G to inherit an ageing system with no support, characterised by corruption, lethargy and was destined to fail.
2. Other historians argue that Gorbachev’s political reforms were unnecessary and flawed, and this was what destabilised the political system. They tend to highlight two of his mistakes, the first being his belief that the Soviet political system could be changed without undermining Communist Party authority. He introduced political rights, freedom of speech and democratic elections in an attempt to reinvigorate Communism but instead invited widespread attacks that ultimately made the system unsustainable. Secondly, he made a series of tactical errors when introducing these reforms, wearing his position and strengthening his rivals, e.g. he refused to sand for election as President of the USSR.

Question 3

Overview of Interpretation 3: The nationalist resurgence in the Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe

Answer 3

Some historians argue that nationalism was the blame for the collapse of the USSR.

1. Some historians think that nationalist uprisings were bound to happen. They subscribe to this view as they believe that nationalism is such a powerful force that it was inevitable that at some point these individual nations would want independence and bring about the collapse of the USSR. For these historians, the unrest that occurred in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s were an inevitability.
2. Other historians reject the idea that nationalist resurgence was inevitable pointing to the fact that there was little nationalistic sentiment prior to 1985, and instead argue that Gorbachev’s political reforms provoked nationalist unrest by giving unprecedented political independence, allowing nationalist groups to organise, set out their agenda, win elections and start calling for independence from the USSR, a trend beginning in Poland and Hungary before spreading across Eastern Europe. 1 by 1, 15 Soviet republics left the USSR, until it eventually collapsed.
3. Some historians synthesise these ideas, suggesting that the idea of grouping many nations united inly by Communism was flawed from the start, and Gorbachev’s reforms acted as the trigger for this problem to emerge.

Question 4

Overview of Interpretation 4: The Personal Actions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin

Answer 4

These historians who explain things in terms of significant individuals shaping events or ideas, known as intentionalists (as opposed to structuralists) and believe that the fall of the USSR can be explained through the personal actions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

1. Some historians blame the actions of Mikhail Gorbachev, and tend to argue that the failure of his economic reforms, unintended consequences of his political reforms and general errors of judgement destabilised the political system, leading to its collapse.
2. Other historians blame the actions of Boris Yeltsin, suggesting that he undermined the authority of the Communist Party, providing a focal point for Russian nationalism, or offering a credible alternative to Gorbachev.

Question 5

What were the weaknesses of the Soviet economy when Gorbachev came to power in 1985?

Answer 5

1. Stalin: Under Stalin the USSR had experienced relative economic success with consistent industrial production improvement and the fastest growing economy in the world with growth averaging 7.1% per year between 1950 and 1958.
2. Khrushchev: Production of consumer goods was below target, agriculture was inefficient and economic growth declined to an average of 5.3% per year between 1958 and 1964.
3. Brezhnev: The situation deteriorated, agriculture used over 25% of the workforce, 26% of government spending and cultivated an area larger than the USA yet produced only 1/6 of the output of American farms. Industrial growth stagnated, the overall growth rate plummeted further to 2% in the 1970s.

Question 6

Evidence of long term economic failure

Answer 6

1. Agricultural: By 1982, under Brezhnev, agriculture used over 25% of the workforce, 26% of government spending and cultivated an area larger than the USA, yet produced only 1/6 of the output of American farms.
2. Chaos and Organisation: Khrushchev constantly changed his economic policies, e.g. in 1957 he decentralised by replacing Gosplan with 105 regional planning agencies, but then began to reverse this policy from 1958 to 1964.
3. Stagnation of government under Brezhnev: A consequence of not replacing government officials was that the USSR became a ‘gerontocracy’ under Brezhnev, a country with an old government, e.g. in 1961 the average age of members of the Central Committee was 52, and by 1981 this had increased to 62. By 1984, 7 out of the 11 members of the Politburo were over the age of 70. To accommodate this, meetings were limited to only 40 minutes in length.
4. Excessive levels of military spending: Brezhnev increased military investment, with the goal of matching the USA’s nuclear firepower. Military spending rose from 11% in 1964 to 13% in 1970, which was a significant drain on economic resources leading to insufficient investment in consumer goods and infrastructure.
5. Inherent problems of the command economy: Centrally planning every aspect of the economy in a country as large as the USSR is such an enormous, complex task that errors, disorganisation and ultimately failure are almost inevitable. Economist Milton Friedman argues that command economies inevitably fall victim to the political self-interest of the individuals that run them.