Economic Approach III: Trade and complex risk governance: Science vs. Precautionary Risk Approaches

Question 1

What is the challenge of complex risk governance?

Answer 1

Cooperation (international relations) - difficult to “solve” collective risks in a world of 170+ sovereign states.

E.G. Climate related risks:

• Conflict over resources, border disputes, wars
• Tensions over energy supply
• Economic damage to coastal cities and critical infrastructure
• Environmentally-induced migration
• Poverty, political radicalization
• Threat to international cooperation, negative spill-overs

Question 2

What is the contemporary primary concern with health risks?

Answer 2

Biotechnology, new technologies:

• Accidental release uncontrollable harmful substances: biotech medicines, agro-biotech
• Unknown effects of approvered substances: inadequate foodsafety regulation, regulation of chemicals, etc.

The issue: what to do if individual risks may inflict irreversible damage to humans, animals, plants, the environment.

NOT deliberate release of uncontrollable harmful substances e.g. bio-warfare or bio-terrorism (but you can find manuals online to manufacture diseases - this is a different threat).

Question 3

What is a complex risk?

Answer 3

Traded-related risk/ trans-border business risk - how to improve global risk governance?

Global risks: simple vs. complex risks, some are correctable, others irreversible, exposing individuals, animals, plants and the environment to risk created by global business activities.

Therefore the globalisation of trade, production and investments needs regulation of more complex transborder risks, involving all levels of global governance.

Question 4

How is climate change a complex risk?

Answer 4

The time horizon and scale of threat is different - complex inter-linkages of environmental variables (Deere-Birkbeck 2009).

Question 5

What 4 categories are present in Stirling (2007)’s conceptual framework?

Answer 5

1. Risk
2. Ambiguity
3. Uncertainty
4. Ignorance

Question 6

What does Deere-Birkbeck (2009) write about?

Answer 6

Complex risk governance: how IR will influence global risk governance: stakeholders - from formal institutional arrangements (as among governments), to informal (involving a range of stakeholders with or without direct government engagement) - complexity has increased.

• Changing geopolitical relations and tensions among states keen to build and preserve economic competitiveness
• Systemic problems persists - asymmetries of power, resources, institutional capacity and access to technologies (emerging markets increasing, but still asymmetrical power)
• Creates inequality and justice - critical issues in global risk governance

Question 7

Risk governance deficit: what complex dimensions are there?

Answer 7

Economic, political, technical and managerial dimensions.

Question 8

What are some of the challenges of risk governance?

Answer 8

• Consultative processes for identifying and assessing risks
• International cooperation with respect to burden-sharing
• Allocation of responsibility and knowledge-sharing
• Adaptability of international regimes and institutions to changing circumstances; coordination; effective monitoring
• Building capacity for compliance
• Regulatory capture in the management of risk

It is easier to agree on the need for implementation than actually implementing it.

Question 9

What organisations do Lee et al. (2009) use as examples of global governance?

Answer 9

WTO and WHO (trade liberalisation and regulatory protection)

Question 10

How can a nation state deviate from international standard of e.g. WTO?

Answer 10

States have the right to regulate, but if you deviate from intl. standard and raise requirements you have to provide a reason & good evidence (scientific evidence) - precautionary principle is not enough.

Question 11

How can WTO cases be political problems?

Answer 11

Competing risk governance models e.g. in the case of EU vs. USA hormone beef ban - different approaches to policy-making: EU precautionary & USA want scientific evidence that it is harmful.

Question 12

Is it only EU that take a precautionary approach?

Answer 12

No. USA is also precautionary but on different risk.

Question 13

What change does Vogel (2012) describe?

Answer 13

The shift in regulatory stringency in EU and USA. The change in selective risk governance from 1970’s until present. Vogel describes EU as becoming more precautionary over time and USA less.

Question 14

4 models explaining change in transatlantic risk selection?

Answer 14

1. Convergence: globalisation yields harmonisation
2. Divergence: EU risk averse/ US risk taking or EU informal corporatist/ US adversarial legalism?
3. Flip-flop (e.g. Vogel 2012): US more PP in 70’s & EU more PP since 90’s
4. Hybridisation (e.g. Stirling 2007): Borrowing, learning e.g. EIA, ET, BCA, TRI, PP. Heterogeneity across and within regulatory system.

Question 15

What has created complex risks, and a demand for complex risk governance?

Answer 15

Economic globalisation.

Question 16

What does complex risk governance challenge?

Answer 16

Sovereignity, democracy and security (therefore it is highly contested).

Question 17

What are some of the barriers to effective complex risk governance?

Answer 17

Political, cultural and technical barriers.

Question 18

What is the key difference between the scientific approach and the precautionary principle?

Answer 18

Scientific approach is keen to avoid over-regulation, by looking to scientific based risk assessment to prove something is harmful before regulating. The precautionary principle is keen to avoid under-regulation, the logic being to avoid exposing society and natural environment to unknown and potentially extremely harmful consequences, thus regulating until proof of no harm.