Volume 2 - Unit 4. Protecting Air Force Security Systems (3) - Fence questions = nuclear areas Flashcards Preview

CDC 5 Level > Volume 2 - Unit 4. Protecting Air Force Security Systems (3) - Fence questions = nuclear areas > Flashcards

Flashcards in Volume 2 - Unit 4. Protecting Air Force Security Systems (3) - Fence questions = nuclear areas Deck (186)
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1

What was the split knowledge concept designed to do?

prevent a long individual from having complete knowledge of the entire launch function

2

What personnel make up the A and B split knowledge?

A side personnel - SF
B side personnel - maintenance

3

What do members use to support the A and B split knowledge concept?

MEED - missile electronic encryption device

4

How is the missile electronic encryption device used in the A and B split knowledge concept?

personnel use MEEED to pass authentications to the control center verifying their status in order to open launch facilities

SF only know how to manipulate A side of circuit - SF will never know B side

Maintenance only know how to manipulate B side of circuit - maintenance will never know A side

5

What system is the missile electronic encryption device part of?

missile entry control system

6

What does the missile entry control system consist of?

documents and canisters required for daily operations in missile complexes and are split into the A/B cryptographic control groups

7

Members from the "A" and "B" side do not have:

the same device supporting the split knowledge concept

8

Where are nuclear weapons stored?

in exclusion areas within limited areas

9

How big are limited and exclusion areas?

these areas must encompass the smallest practicable amount of geographical space

10

Why must limited and exclusion areas be small?

to eliminate requirements for securing/maintaining unnecessary terrain

11

What consideration must be taken into account when reducing the size of limited and exclusion areas?

ensuring sufficient distance between perimeter barriers and weapons to aid response forces when dealing with unauthorized access to nuclear weapons by intruders

12

What presents a strategic circumstance for a planned or opportunistic attack against a facility containing a nuclear weapon?

open entrance to a building or protective aircraft shelter (PAS) encompassing an unlocked weapons storage vault containing a nuclear weapon

13

What must be done when doors to facilities housing nuclear weapons are opened?

adequate armed security or support forces and other security measures should be in place prior to opening the entrance

14

The approaches to open entrances to structures containing nuclear weapons must be kept under the surveillance of:

at least one armed person who has no other duties than security

15

Can the armed personnel providing security for an open entrance of a facility containing nuclear weapons provide surveillance concurrently to more than one open entrance?

yes if the requirement for surveillance is met for each entrance

16

Individuals performing surveillance for facilities containing nuclear weapons must be in a position to deny unauthorized access by:

providing effective directly aimed fire to repel potential intruders

17

Surveillance requirement for facilities containing nuclear weapons is met when:

1. posted sentry can provide observation of those approaches to open entrances
2. such approaches are clearly visible from the posted location
3. armed security or support force person is capable of bringing directly aimed fire
page 4-25 volume 2

18

What are the exemptions from the surveillance requirement for facilities containing nuclear weapons and open doors? (2)

1. entrances to regularly manned maintenance and inspection facilities
2. entrances to administrative areas and non-nuclear maintenance bays

19

When are entrances to regularly manned maintenance and inspection facilities exempt from the open door nuclear weapon surveillance requirement? (4)

1. while facilities are manned
2. where the facility entrance is used for routine personnel entry and exit
3. when a person is physical entering or exiting through doors, no surveillance
4. unless someone is physically entering or exiting through doors, entrances must be closed and adequately secured

20

When are entrances to administrative areas and non-nuclear maintenance bays where nuclear weapons are temporarily located exempt from open door surveillance?

when nuclear weapons are within physically separated nuclear weapon maintenance bays (exclusion areas)

21

What systems must permanent nuclear storage structures have to protect nuclear weapons? (2)

1. denial systems deployed to protect the weapons
2. delay system to impede unauthorized access

22

What are two examples of denial systems?

1. remote weapons systems
2. facility access denial systems

23

Which denial systems are more effective?

interior systems are more effective than ones used outside the structure

24

Why are interior denial systems more effective than ones positioned outside? (2)

1. they cannot be easily observed and defeated by an adversary
2. better protected from adverse weather

25

When are outside denial systems used? (2)

1. in the absence of interior denial systems
2. in addition to interior denial systems

26

Are denial systems deployed outside encouraged?

strongly encouraged

27

What are examples of denial systems placed outside the structure?

1. remote weapons systems
2. massive modular blocks (MMB)

28

For exposed weapons systems (outside
a structure) involved in maintenance activities, maintenance personnel are considered part of the:

final denial system

29

What do delay systems need to consist of?

various technologies designed to impede adversaries and allow sufficient time for response forces to respond BEFORE and adversary gains unauthorized access to a weapon

30

What maximizes security force delay capabilities? (3 examples)

1. MMB - massive modular blocks
2. internal locking systems
3. integrated effect of channeling the adversary

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