Lecture 9 - Mathmatical and theoretical insights into animal behaviour Flashcards Preview

Animal behaviour - year 2 > Lecture 9 - Mathmatical and theoretical insights into animal behaviour > Flashcards

Flashcards in Lecture 9 - Mathmatical and theoretical insights into animal behaviour Deck (37)
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1

what do you need to make predictions?

theory

2

what is the inclusive fitness theory?

“The social behaviour of a species evolves in such a way that in each distinct behaviour-evoking situation the individual will seem to value his neighbours’ fitness against his own according to the coefficients of relationship appropriate to that situation.”
- underpins everything we do in animal behaviour

3

who came up with the inclusive fitness theory?

w.d hamilton

4

what is direct fitness?

increasing the reproductive success of the individual

5

what is indirect fitness?

increasing the fitness of relatives

6

what is hamiltons rule

behaviour is favoured if rb >c

7

what do c, b and r stand for in hamiltons rule

c-‘cost’ to actor of social behaviour
b-‘benefit’ to recipient of social behaviour
r -genetic relatedness between actor and recipient

8

would c and b be positive or negative when an individual gives food to a recipient

c is positive- as cost has increased
b is positive - positive because they benefit

9

would c and b be positive or negative when an individual steals food from a recipient

c is negative - no cost because they gain food
b is negative - negative because they die

10

what would the values of c and b be if they swim past a recipient

c is zero
b is zero

11

describe an example of hamiltons rule for 'helping'

Give food to recipient -
Actor recipient
1 (lose food) 3 (gain food) c is positive b is positive
1<3r

12

would the behaviour of 'helping' be favoured by relatedness?

yes this behaviour is favoured by high relatedness.
e.g. if r = 0.5 (siblings or parent-offspring) then Hamilton’s rule is satisfied because 1 < 1.5

13

what effect does the behaviour 'cannibalism' have on relatedness

Cannibalise recipient
actor recipient
-1 (gain food) -10 (die) c is negative b is negative
Hamilton’s Rule: -1 < -10rThis behaviour is favoured by low relatedness.
e.g. if r = 0.5 (siblings) then Hamilton’s rule is not satisfied because -1 > -5

14

when are tiger salamanders more likely to develop into cannibals?

are more likely to develop into cannibals if they are in groups containing:
(1) many conspecifics
(2) variation in larval size
(3) mostly unrelated individuals

15

what is the essence of game theory?

- normally when an individual makes a decision it is solely about their own behaviour
- the essence of game theory is that 'your behavioural response should depend on what others in the population are doing'

16

describe game theory in terms of sex ratios

If others are producing sons, it’s better to produce daughters as this will maximise number of grand-offspring.
If the sex ratio is even (1F:1M) it’s better to produce an even ratio of sons and daughters.
= Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS)

17

example of species that can choose which sex to produce?

- haplodiploidy in insects - fertilised eggs produce females and unfertilised produces males
- some reptiles produce different sexes depending on the temperature their eggs are incubated at

18

has the ESS phenomena been seen in humans before?

after the world war the population was female biased - there was recorded a surge in baby boys then born

19

what are the fitness values of the sexes at an even sex ratio?

At an even sex ratio sons and daughters give equal fitness returns. The even sex ratio is an:
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS)

20

what effect does a female bias have?

then there is more females for the males to mate with so the sons can produce more offspring and is more valuable o the parent because they are passing on more of their genes and increasing fitness - therefore parents will want to produce more males and eventually the sex ratio will balance out - opposite for an excess of sons

21

what theories did john maynard-smith introduce?

- game theory and pairwise interactions

22

2 examples of pairwise contests

The Hawk-Dove Game
The Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois Game

23

describe the hawk and dove in pairwise interactions

Hawk- Never shares, always fights
Dove - Will share, never fights, retreats if opponent fights

24

what do you have to do modle the hawk dove theory

have to assign fitness pay off to each strategy
value of resource = v
cost of fighting to loser = c

25

what is the pay off equation for a hawk v hawk

(v-c)/2

26

what is the pay off equation for when a dove is a focal individual and its opponent is a hawk

0

27

what is the pay off equation for when a hawk is a focal individual and a dove is the opponent

v

28

what is the pay off equation for dove v dove

v/2

29

which strategy is most successful between the hawk and the dove?

(ESS)- cannot be invaded by another strategy

- Hawk always wins against Dove, but Hawk pays a fighting cost

- Dove never fights so doesn’t pay a cost and always shares so gets some pay-off

30

what happens when one of the strategies is rare?

- hawk can always invade if dove are common and hawk rare - v>v/2
- dove can invade is c>v i.e cost of fighting to loser is bigger than the resource value

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