Lecture 19- Human cooperation Flashcards Preview

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Flashcards in Lecture 19- Human cooperation Deck (10)
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1
Q

What is Hamilton’s rule?

A

-Selection will favour cooperative, or altruistic behaviour if:

br - c > 0 where,

b = benefit to beneficiary;

c = cost to donor;

and r = coefficient of relatedness (degree to which actor and beneficiary share genes)

  • This ‘rule’ makes the simple prediction that individuals are more likely to direct cooperative or altruistic behaviour toward relatives than toward non-rela-ves.
  • the more related the more likely to cooperate
  • the inequality has to exceed 0
  • r is very important but costs and benefits are also important
  • important in insect systems since many do not reproduce whereas in vertebrate species the helpers can, usually just younger individuals waiting for territories etc.
2
Q

How doe Hamilton’s rule apply to humans?

A
  • may have applied when humans lived in relatively small kin-based groups – humans as cooperative breeding families
  • but modern, complex human societies couldn’t be more different – groups of cooperating humans are rarely related
  • why cooperate? -families are often not as involved in raising offspring -
3
Q

What is the argument about the evolution of cooperation in humans?

A

It is often argued that a key feature of human society is the profound level of cooperation exhibited among unrelated individuals. In general, cooperation is not predicted by conventional natural selection: individuals are unlikely to enhance the reproductive success of others if it creates a fitness cost to themselves

4
Q

What are the possible reasons for people to cooperate?

A

Two solutions

  • kin selection — cooperation may evolve among relatives because any genetic basis to a tendency to help relatives is likely to be carried by both the donor and recipient
  • game theory — a mathematical tool that helps explain collective behaviour by the interactions of the individuals involved
5
Q

What is meant by the Dunkirk spirit?

A
  • in 1940, many civilians assisted, at great risk to themselves, in the evacua-on of allied troops from Dunkirk by flo-llas of pleasure craJ and working barges
  • theoretical models suggest that parochial altruism (the combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility) provides a selective advantage to groups, resulting in the coevolution of parochial altruism and intergroup conflict by group extinction through conquest and assimilation

-very risky behaviour -

6
Q

What is the setup of the field experiment in Northern Ireland?

A

A field experiment

  • many years of sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland
  • geographic regions separated along religious affilia-on
  • opportunity to inves-gate generosity (coopera-on) toward in-group and out-group

-Methods -Surveyed households, asking if they would care to donate to a primary school within their locality, a primary school outside their locality, or a neutral charity (Save the Children). Other details obtained

7
Q

What were the results of the field experiment in Northern Ireland?

A

Conflict

• clear evidence for the existence of parochialism: individuals 25% more likely to donate to an in-group school than an out-group school (note, location of the school not specified)

-Cooperation

  • no evidence that ‘threat’ influenced within-group cooperation;
  • SES was better predictor (income, education, etc).
8
Q

What is the setup of prisoner’s dilemma?

A

Two prisoners

  • unable to communicate with each other
  • must choose to (a) testify against the other (defect) or (b) remain silent (cooperate) Their sentence depends upon what both prisoners claim
  • if one testifies against the other, and the other remains silent, the former goes free and the other gets 3 years
  • if each testifies against the other, then both get two years
  • if both remain silent, both get one year

-But cooperation occurs between naïve players – perhaps indirect reciprocity is important: helping someone or refusing to do so, may have an impact on one’s reputation within a group.

9
Q

What is connection of prisoner’s dilemma and reputation?

A
  • Players decisions about whether to donate were always anonymous within the game -Individuals were given £3, paired and randomly designated donor (give 50p) or receiver (obtain £1). Giving something increases an image score, which was displayed at the end of the session.
  • The receivers’ image score had an influence on the donors’ decision: receivers who got something had a higher image score than those that got nothing. Similarly, the donors’ decisions were also influenced by their own image score: donors with a low image score were more likely to give something (and thus improve their image score)
  • then another scenario when the individuals then played the prisoner’s dilemma with their final image score revealed
  • reputation image influences long term outcome of playing prisoner’s dilemma (direct reciprocity game)
10
Q

What happened in the Prisoner’s Dilemma when the pay offs etc. were altered in each game?

A

-Pay-offs of each iteration in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game; two games were played that alter the relative pay-offs for defection and punishment. Cooperation means paying a cost c for the other person to get benefit

b, defection means earning a pay-off d at a cost d to the other person

-here you could punish the other individuals as well

a, All-out cooperation.

b, Punish and perish.

c, defection for defection can sometimes restore

d turning the other other cheek can also restore cooperation

e mutual punishment is mutual destruction

f punishment does not restore cooperation

g guns don’t kill people, people kill people, an unprovoked firs strike destroys cooperation

-There is no correlation between the frequency of playing cooperation or defection and the average pay-off at the end of a game