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Flashcards in Final Deck (54)
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1
Q

Compatibilism

A
  • Soft determinism
  • Believes we are 100% determined
  • View that free actions are compatible with causal determinism
  • The type of freedom believed: MORAL freedom: freedom only requires ability to do what you want (not ability to do otherwise, that’s hard determinism)
    • Debate between HD and compatibilism is NOT over whether we’re determined; it’s over the correct analysis of freedom
2
Q

Twin Earth Criticism

A
  • Two earths exactly same, except have ability to do otherwise (not determined) than what they want to do
  • Wouldn’t utilize doing otherwise because they’d still want to do what they want to do
  • HD says freedom is pointless
  • Compatibilist says they have lousy definition of freedom (compatibilist definition better)
3
Q

Manipulative Brain-Washer

A
  • Type of problem with compatibilism
  • HD support: Russians steal Pence and implant chip in his head that makes him want to assassinate Trump, and he finds it the right thing to do, so HD would say Pence is doing what he wants, but that’s not free will
  • Patty Hearst
4
Q

Ordinary Upbringing Rebuttal

A

-Compatibilist Response to manipulative brainwasher: Kidnap Pence and brainwash him to make him want to assassinate Trump (and these are true facts, not sci-fi); person goes insane and you build them up again; not a rational process, but the way you were raised was “learning” (you can decide to accept/reject)

5
Q

Locked (Locke’s?) Room Example

A
  • Type of problem with compatibilism
  • HD: You’re locked in a bar, watching a game of UNLV vs. UNR; UNLV is winning, and you don’t want to leave; your friend who came from UNR wants to leave, but can’t because you’re locked inside; HD believes one friend is more free
  • Comp: would say you’re not more free; just more fortunate
6
Q

Being Free vs. Being Lucky

A
  • Response to Locke’s room example
  • You’re not more free; you’re just more fortunate
  • We can do what we want and not be free
  • Related to discussion of compatibilism
    • Comp: being free means being able to do what you want to do
    • HD: being free means being able to do otherwise
  • Ex: Two people shackled down and can’t move’ one wants to get up and leave, but he can’t; other person is happy to be there because he’s tired (he’s just more fortunate)
  • Ex: of bar and watching game
7
Q

Cultural Differences Argument

A
  1. Different cultures have different moral codes
    • Appeal to famous cases (Eskimos and infanticide)
    • This premise can be true
  2. Therefore, there are no objective, universal, culturally independent facts or considerations which determine the truth or falsehood of different moral claims
    • ex: you can live in a culture where women are treated as second-class citizens, it is morally okay; we may not like it, but that’s just our cultural bias
    • This premise can be false, so it’s an invalid argument
8
Q

Relativism’s Self-Refutation

A
  • One extreme consequence of relativism
  • Relativism asserts that the truth-value of a statement is always relative to some particular standpoint. This implies that the same statement can be both true and false.
  • An act can be both moral and immoral, but the two cannot both be tru
  • Ex: Professor Ramsey saying “No one is lecturing right now”
9
Q

No Moral Progress Consequence

A
  • One extreme consequence of relativism
  • All you can say is that there’s been a change
  • Can’t detect that things have been bettered
10
Q

Legal vs. Moral

A

-They’ll overla a lot, but not everything that is immoral is illegal

11
Q

Necessary Conditions for Society

A
  • The must be certain conditions, or societies would be dysfunctional – Social Contract Theory
    • No murder, no stealing, etc.
12
Q

Divine Command Theory

A
  • a.k.a. Ground Morality Through Theological Considerations
  • An act is right if and only if God permits it; an act is morally wrong if God forbid it
  • Scriptural support and examples: Abraham and Hosea (God said it was okay for him to sleep with her, so it was morally okay)
  • Doctrine that God is the creator of morality
13
Q

God’s Goodness Uninteresting

A
  • Second big problem from Plato
  • Abandoning divine command theory
  • God always chooses to do what is morally right, but morally right = what God chooses or prefers or wants, so God always chooses to do what He chooses/prefers/wants, so 3rd attribute (morally good/perfect) is now unimpressive
  • Tyrant analogy
14
Q

Plato’s Questions About God

A

-Is an act right (or wrong) because God allows (or forbids) it, or does God allow (or forbid) it because it is right (or wrong)?

  • If former, then, first big problem: arbitrariness – torturing innocent children could be morally right
  • Second big problem: God’s own goodness is uninteresting – tyrant analogy (?)

-If latter, then morality is not based upon God’s commandments and DC is false

15
Q

Arbitrariness of Morality Objection

A

-God’s commands are not fully arbitrary

  • The constraining role of Divine Nature
    • His divine nature guides his decisions

-God could’ve just as easily had divine nature that said it was okay to torture kids. Just shift arbitrariness to what kind of divine nature God has

16
Q

Expected Utility

A
  • Things that have highest expected utility are best
  • Total utility is what matters (adding up all hedons and dolors) – once done calculating, do one with highest expected utility
17
Q

Moral Consequentialism

A

-The view that the morality of the act depends on the consequences (motives/intent don’t)

Related to act utilitarianism

-Good to perform if promotes happiness and bad if promotes unhappiness

18
Q

Act Utilitarianism

A
  • Key: consequences
  • The degree to which the act creates pain or pleasure, happiness or unhappiness
  • It tends to promote happiness = right thing to do; if tends to promote sadness = wrong thing to do
  • (If same as utilitarianism: a moral theory that says right actions are those that result in the most beneficial balance of good over bad consequences for everyone involved)
19
Q

Hedons & Dolors

A
  • Hedon = unit of happiness
  • Dolor = unit of unhappiness (think of doldrums)
  • Intensity and duration matter
20
Q

Quality Dimension of Pleasure

A
  • Third dimension to the graph
  • Mill’s response to “Doctrine of Swine” objection
  • Human pleasure goes beyond bodily/physical gratification; thus deeper pleasure – like intelligence
21
Q

Matrix Criticism

A
  • Mill’s response to swine using Matrix: It’s good he wanted to get them out! The quality of happiness of people in the Matrix isn’t of good quality
  • Sometimes to have dignity may include unhappiness
  • Utilitarianism says Keanu Reeves trying to get people out of Matrix was right thing to do because the people weren’t REALLY happy; they were being deceived and lied to, so it wasn’t real happiness
22
Q

“Doctrine of Swine” Objection

A
  • If utilitarianism is correct, then only relevant moral consideration is amount of pleasure
    • ”If it feels good, do it”
  • False that the only relevant moral consideration is amount of pleasure
    • This second premise is doing all the work
    • Right thing to do doesn’t always produce pleasure

-Therefore, utilitarianism is false

23
Q

“Harm to Innocent” Objection

A
  • Difficulty for utilitarianism
  • Sometimes utilitarianism requires acts that are morally wrong (may cause harm to innocent person)
  • The “Rawlsian” alternative and the moral point of view
  • Ex: trolley problem and surgeon situation
24
Q

Supererogatory Acts

A
  • Acts above and beyond call of duty
  • You don’t have to do these things
  • Not required, but really helpful
  • Ex: giving money to charity
25
Q

Shallow Pond Example

A
  • Meeting for dinner with friend at nice restaurant, and friend comes late and says he/she decided to walk to restaurant. On his way, he passed by a pond where a child was drowning and didn’t want to help because it would ruin his new leather shoes
  • Bad reason not to help
  • Meant to support Peter Singer’s second premise on ethics (that we should give as much as we can)
26
Q

Sedan Example

A
  • Friend likes to repair old vintage sedan, and while taking his car out for a test drive, he passed by someone who was injured (shot and bleeding in leg). They ask for ride or they’ll lose their leg. Friend decides not to give ride because he’ll make a mess of newly upholstered seats. Friend leaves and later person was picked up, but lost his leg
  • Bad reason not to help
  • Meant to support Peter Singer’s second premise on ethics (that we should give as much as we can)
    • Narration of Peter Singer’s argument
27
Q

Envelope Example

A
  • Saving up money for new phone; you get letter in mail about refugee camp and how you donating $125 would save one or two children’s’ lives; but your read letter, say it’s a good cause, but put it on the shelf and use money to buy a new phone that you’ve been saving for instead
  • Bad reason not to help
  • Meant to support Peter Singer’s second premise on ethics (that we should give as much as we can)
  • 5 reasons to think behavior in envelope case is morally worse than sedan (and shallow pond?)
    • Cost is less
    • Number affected by inaction is greater
    • What is lost is greater
    • Victims are not responsible for situation
    • Victims’ behavior is not morally dubious
28
Q

Global Village

A
  • Because of advancement in telecommunication, shipment, transportation, etc., the world is much smaller
  • Easier to get things from place to place and to communicate with one another
  • Part of Singer’s argument
  • Helps Singer’s second premise
    • Irrelevance of proximity: distance may make us feel less obligated, but doesn’t remove actual obligation; appeals to ignorance and inability no longer plausible
29
Q

Proximity Factor

A
  • Distance may make us FEEL less obligated, but it doesn’t remove actual obligation
    • Seeing child drowning may be more psychologically influencing, but feeling doesn’t matter; what matters is your capacity to prove assistance, not distance

-Appeals to ignorance and inability no longer plausible

30
Q

Extreme Socialism Objection

A

-Objection to Singer’s argument

  • Reply: dubious assumption all socialism is bad; arguments requires only preventing very bad things from happening (not making everyone equal)
    • there are good social democracies; not all socialism is bad; people confuse it with totalitarianism and fascism
31
Q

Too Drastic Objection

A

-Objection to Singer’s argument, but singer’s response

  • Reply: progress sometimes requires drastic revisions; often change that makes a radical modification requires drastic change, but it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do it
    • slavery analogy (freeing African Americans resulted in drastic changes – who would work on the plantations? Now, have to pay)
    • congruence with religious traditions
    • many say Singer doesn’t go far enough
32
Q

Epistemology

A
  • Exploring our access to the truth; examining human reason, perception, and knowledge
  • Philosophical study of knowledge
33
Q

Dreaming Argument

A
  • Second assault on the senses
  • Primary assault on a priori beliefs and almost everything else
  • Dreams can feel very real and many times when dreaming, you don’t know you are
  • You feel like your hand is in front of your face, but you’re just dreaming
  • Key Point: We can’t be certain that we aren’t now dreaming
    • For any moment, you can’t be 100% sure you aren’t dreaming
34
Q

Deceiving Demon Argument

A
  • Third assault on senses; primary assault on a priori (mathematical) beliefs and (almost) everything else
  • Evil being that manipulates your beliefs
  • Demon is manipulating brain, messing with your beliefs and how you form them, leading to a false a priori
  • Clearing the decks with doubt
    • No source immune from deception

-Note: Don’t need to believe demon is real, only possible

35
Q

Cogito Ergo Sum

A
  • ”I think therefore I am”
  • The only thing to pass Cartesian doubt
  • Certainty about the content of the mind
    • We may not know if thoughts are experiences are accurate, but we can know we are having such thoughts and experiences

-I exist and certain things are going on in my mind (experiences and thoughts)

36
Q

Foundationalism

A

-Descartes’s goal

  • An edifice of knowledge
    • inverted pyramid

Descartes (and Locke)
-Descartes says foundationalism found within (for Locke, found in observation)

  • All knowledge grounded in some rock-solid, basic foundation
    • To Descartes, it can’t be doubted
  • Related to empiricism
  • Seeking a solid foundation for the inverted pyramid of knowledge
  • Requires absolute certainty
  • Primary tool: the wrecking ball of Cartesian doubt
37
Q

Cartesian Circle

A
  • Problem with Descartes’ project of the Cartesian circle
  • Begging the question
  • Idea that Descartes’ reasoning runs in a circle
  • Why suppose ancient principles are correct? (Butterfly effect; page 38)
    • Justification appears to be that they are believed clearly and distinctly (appeal to the “light of nature”) (anything he understands clearly and distinctly is true, but that’s his argument’s end/goal, so he’s begging the question; he’s cheating)
    • But the reliability of things understood clearly and distinctly is the very thing we must establish
  • Only way he can have idea of God is because God exists; he couldn’t have made Him up because God is more perfect than he
  • He says he understands this principle (which is one of his pre-existing beliefs/one he believes he was born with) because he understands it clearly and distinctly (which is his end point/the point he’s trying to prove), so he thinks it is trustworthy, but he’s just running in a circle!
38
Q

Cartesian Doubt

A
  • To pass cartesian doubt is extremely difficult
  • Primary tool to destroy absolute certainty needed by Descartes to create solid foundation for inverted pyramid of knowledge
  • Think of building imploding if any doubt (crack) exists
  • Not one drop of doubt is allowed
  • Cartesian Test: Is there any possible way this belief could be false?
    • Yes: fails test of Cartesian doubt
    • No: passes test of Cartesian doubt

-Stronger than ordinary doubt

39
Q

Presentational vs. Formal Reality

A
  • An idea’s source must have as much formal (actual) reality as the idea’s own presentational (objective) reality
  • Formal: depicts things in my nature; actual reality
  • Presentational: in a perfect being
40
Q

Euclid vs. Newton

A

-Competing paradigms of knowledge

  • Euclid:
    • Role model for Descartes
    • Gold standard was mathematics
    • Important to e correct and avoid all error
    • Deductive reasoning
    • Start off with foundation, and build upon that, work your way up
  • Newton:
    • Role model for Locke
    • Make observations of world
    • Inductively infer basic laws of nature/abductive reasoning/inference to best explanation
    • No guarantee that it’s right
41
Q

Ego-Centric Predicament

A
  • Demonstrated that one thing you can be certain of is your mine, your thoughts, your experiences, but you don’t know for certain about the world around you (could just be deceived)
  • Trying to penetrate the screen of perception
  • Avoiding solipsism
42
Q

Naive Representationalism

A
  • Inner representations fully “resemble” that which they represent
  • Type of representational theory of perception – no direct perception of anything except inner representations
  • What’s on the inside is identical to what is out there in the world
  • yu 100% experience the world as it truly is
  • Ex: you smell a sweet apple, so you think there’s actually something out there with that smell
43
Q

Sophisticated Representationalism

A
  • Limited Representationalism
  • Includes primary and secondary qualities
  • Locke’s account of perception
  • SOME of the ways in which your mind represents reality exists in the real world, some does not mirror
    • primary (does mirror) vs. secondary (doesn’t mirror)
44
Q

Resemblance Assumption

A
  • Why do we think what we see is the true/real thing? There’s a chain reaction (like with vision process), something could mess up
  • Type of problem with representational theory of perception
  • Assumption that the way we experience things is the way they really exist, the way they really are
  • Note: direct comparison between representation and represented is NOT possible (stepping out of body and seeing through other perspective is not possible; you’ve never compared to things that are similar to each other)
45
Q

Empiricism

A
  • Knowledge through experience
  • You’re born tabula rasa (blank slate)
  • Learn things through observation/experience
  • Includes: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Skinner
  • View that our knowledge of the empirical world comes solely from sense experience
46
Q

Rationalism

A
  • Innate knowledge
  • Believe you know things when born
  • Ex: By age 3, you know a language
  • Includes: Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Chomsky
  • View that through unaided reason we can come to know what the world is like
47
Q

Innate Knowledge

A
  • Believe you know things when born

- Ex: By age 3, you know a language

48
Q

Primary Qualities

A
  • Motion, number, shape, size
  • The features of objects that cause ideas in us that resemble them (ex: see two apples? There ARE two apples)
  • Features of things that cause similar sensations (ideas) in our minds – we can experience as they really are
  • Quality in the object
  • (Difference between primary and secondary is the effect on our minds)
49
Q

Secondary Qualities

A
  • Features that cause our experience of color, taste, smell, hot and cold
  • Cause ideas in us that don’t resemble them (particles that make it up) (ex: red color of apple, nothing in the world that has that redness; it’s actually just molecules and you’re experiencing the frequency of the molecules)
  • Ex: No sweetness in molecules, they just create sweetness
  • Power of things to cause dissimilar sensations (ideas) in our minds
  • Don’t exist independently of the mind
  • Quality in the object
  • These qualities are NOT in the mind
50
Q

Variance Arguments

A

-Basic Strategy: show that certain features of our EXPERIENcE of objects cannot be like actual features of the object

  • First Version: Color, Taste
    • It’s impossible for features of material objects to change without corresponding change in object
    • Thus, aspects of our sensory experience of an object that change when there is no corresponding change in object are not qualities inherent in the object
    • Thus, aspects of sensory experiencing of an object that change when there is no corresponding change in object are ideas
    • Ex: orange juice; brush teeth → orange juice tastes bad
    • Ex: porphyry (rock)
  • Second Version: Warm and Cold
    • It’s impossible for features of material objects to be incompatible
      • Can’t have “A” and not “A”ness
    • Thus, aspects of our sensory experience of an object that are incompatible are not qualities inherent in the object
    • Thus, aspects of our sensory experience of an object that are incompatible are ideas
    • Ex: Put one hand in oven, other in freezer, room temperature water in middle → hand in freezer will feel cold, hand in oven will be hot
51
Q

Solipsism

A
  • The view that the only thing that exists is your own mind and your own thoughts
  • Idea that external world does not exist (other people and environment, etc.)
  • Not simply that I exist, but there’s all this stuff in my mind → build everything back up again with what’s in mind (but Descartes is unsuccessful with this)
52
Q

Idealism

A
  • The only things that exist are minds and their ideas
  • To be real is to be mental
  • View that reality is in some way mental in nature
53
Q

Material Substratum

A

-Berkeley

  • The underlying layer
    • Has no features we normally associate with objects
  • Philonous widdles away all of Hylas’ beliefs, so Hylas is stuck, but still wants to believe there has to be something independent of the mind that causes in us the sensations, which is material substratum (but Hylas has no evidence to prove this exists)
  • What Hylas appeals to because he believes there’s still something mind-independent
  • Believes something is still out, a material something, but Hylas can’t describe this “something”
54
Q

Esse Est Percipi

A
  • ”To be is to be perceived”
  • To exist is to be perceived
  • Berkeley
    • Idealist and empiricist

-Objects are collections of ideas, so the only way they can exist is to be perceived