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Flashcards in Armstrong Deck (12)
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1

It is rational to believe that the inner causes of behaviour are brain states (science)

P1: In modern science there is a convergence of
learned opinion and intellectual consensus.
P2: It is rational to confer authority on those facts
that have intellectual consensus.
P3: The scientific consensus is that we can give a
complete account of man (including mental
phenomena) in physio-chemical terms.
P4: (Implied) Scientists agree that the inner causes
of behaviour are brain states.

C: It is rational to believe that the inner causes of
behaviour are brain states.

2

Rylean behaviourism is an unsatisfactory theory of mind

P1: When I think, it appears obvious that there is
something going on which constitutes my thought.
P2 (minor conclusion): There is an inner process
occurring (based on introspection).
P3: Rylean behaviourism denies this inner process.

C: Rylean behaviourism is an unsatisfactory theory of mind.

3

Mental states are the inner causes of behaviour

P1: Mental states are dispositions to behave
(agrees with Ryle)
P2: Dispositions are inner states which cause their
defining effects (disagrees with Ryle).
P4 (minor conclusion): Mental states are the inner
causes of their defining effects.
P5 The defining effects of mental events are
behaviour.

C: Mental states are the inner causes of behaviour

4

Mental states are nothing but physical states of the central nervous system

P1: A mental state is a state of the person apt for
producing certain ranges of behaviour.
P2: We have scientific grounds for believing that
man is nothing but a physical mechanism.

C: Mental states are nothing but physical states of
the central nervous system (or, mental states are
brain states).

5

Physicalism cannot offer a complete account of the human mind

P1: Science can only offer a third-person account
of mental phenomena.
P2: Mental phenomena are first-person conscious
experiences, which cannot be accounted for.

C: Physicalism cannot offer a complete account of
the human mind.

6

As a mental state, consciousness can be regarded as a brain state, a 'self-scanning' mechanism of the central nervous system

P1: Behaviour is the product of an inner mental
state.
P2: We can infer the sensory capacity and
perception of animals from their selective
behaviour.
P3: Sensory perception is a mental state (and thus
a brain state).
P4: Consciousness is a type of perception, whereby our focus is on our mental states

C: As a mental state, consciousness can be regarded as a brain state, a ‘self-scanning’ mechanism of the CNS.

7

It is raional to believe that the nnner causes of behaviour are brain states EVAL

Consensus of the scientific comunity is generally based on testable evidence. Their utility is evident.

Studies have proven that the brain is no doubt the cause for our mental states. When we are hit in the head our cognitive capacity changes

There is not always complete consensus, and views change.

8

Rylean behaviourism is an unsatisfactory theory of mind EVAL

Consciousness can exist without behaviour. (Paralysis, locked-in syndrome)

Behaviour can exist without consciousness (robots)

9

Mental states are the inner causes of behaviour EVAL

A causal link makes sense.

Can we map the brain?

10

Mental states are nothing but physical states of the CNS EVAL

Evident in the findings of neuroscience.

11

Physicalism cannot offer a complete account of the human mind EVAL

True. The brain cannot account for the feeling of eating chocolate, more than just chemicals.

But there must exist a correlation between first person and third person accounts of the mind. A doctor must understand locked-in syndrome without knowing how it feels.

Qualia's resistance to third person objectification does not necessarily make mental states non-physical.

12

Asa a mental state, consciousness can be regarded as a brain state, a self-scanning mechanism of the CNS EVAL

To move from a claim about inferring percetive capacities in animals to inferring that consciousness is a form of perception appears fallacious. It is impossible to know full well if another person is "perceiving" because behaviour can be misleading.

Does not account for what consciousness is, or how it has arisen. Only what it is like, which is perceiving.