Actus Reus Flashcards

1
Q

Kennedy (No.2) [2007]

HL

A

Kennedysupplied class A drugs to the victim, V asked for drugs. The victim voluntarily self-administered the drugs and died as a result. Held: Whilst the supply of drugs was an unlawful act which was a crime, it had not caused death. The death was caused by the voluntary act of the victim, who it is assumed acted under free will, to ‘help him sleep’. Lord Bingham said where there is a “full informed and responsible adult” there can never be liability.

“in the case of a fully-informed and responsible adult, never.” Kennedy(2) (per Lord Bingham at [25])

NB Kennedy (2) does not preclude a conviction based on a negligent performance of a duty to rectify a dangerous situation (see eg Evans (above))

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2
Q

Hughes [2013] UKSC

A

The Road Traffic Act 1988, section 3ZB makes it an offence of strict liability to cause death while in control of car without a valid driving licence or uninsured. Hughes was driving faultlessly, but was doing so deliberately without insurance. The victim, a driver whose ability to drive safely was severely impaired through his self-administration of drugs, collided with Hughes. Hughes could have done nothing to prevent the resulting death of the victim. Supreme court geld: not liable for death. It must follow from the use of the expression “causes…death…by driving” that section 3ZB requires at least some act or omission in the control of the car, which involves some element of fault, whether amounting to careless/inconsiderate driving or not, and which contributes in some more than minimal way to the death. It is not necessary that such act or omission be the principal cause of the death.
LORD HUGHES AND LORD TOULSON giving judgement set out precedence that: There must be “at least some act or omission in the control of the car, which involves some element of fault, whether amounting to careless/inconsiderate driving or not, and which contributes in some more than minimal way to the death”.

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3
Q

Cheshire [1991]

A

D shot V. V underwent an operation where he needed a breathing tube. Two months after the shooting, the wounds had healed but he died of an infection caused by the tube, it should have been spotted. Held” although immediate cause of death was the infection that does not exclude the accused unless:

“even though negligence in the treatment of the victim was the immediate cause of his death, the jury should not regard it as excluding the responsibility of the accused unless the negligent treatment was so independent of his acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that they regard the contribution made by his acts as insignificant” (Beldam LJ)

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4
Q

Blaue [1975]

A

D stabbed V. V needed a blood transfusion but refused because she was a Jehovah’s witness, refused on religious beliefs. She was told if she did not have transfusion that she would die. She then died.

Held: As a matter of policy the assailant should not be allowed to say that victims religious beliefs were unreasonable.D had to take his victims how they found him.

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5
Q

Caldwell

A

House of Lords PRECEDENCE : Held that D could also be judged reckless where he took a risk that was ‘obvious’ to the reasonable person (whether he realised it or not)

NOW OVERTURNED

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6
Q

R v G [2004]

A

Held: removed Caldwell and went for the narrow meaning of recklessness, unless they saw and the deliberately took the risk.

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7
Q

Williams

A

D was driving without a licence or insurance, when a pedestrian stepped in front of his car. the accident was entirely the fault of the pedestrian. Nevertheless, the trial judge ruled that fault was not an element of the offence, and the defendant was convicted. His ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

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8
Q

Taylor [2016] UKSC

A

A man took a truck from a friend, the friend alleges that he did not know about this. Taylor then collided with another car on a bend in a country lane, V was killed. T was uninsured and had alcohol in the blood. Held: although he had alcohol in blood, he is guilty of drunk driving, but not that this circumstance had anything to do with the accident. Held: not liable.

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9
Q

Empress Car Co v National Rivers Authority (1999) HOL

A

River pollution is strict liability offence.
The defendants left an unguarded tap on a large diesel tank next to a river. An unknown vandal trespassed on the property of the defendants and opened the tap, allowing the diesel to discharge into the river. HO Held: D is liable, they only will not be liable if the action of third party was “abnormal or extraordinary”.
The strict liability rule imposes a duty upon the defendant to defend against the deliberate acts against the third party.

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10
Q

Pagett (1983)

A

D used the girl as a shield as he came out of the flat. The police could not see who it was. The appellant fired shots at the police and the police returned fire. The police shot the girl who died. Held: police not liable because it was an instinctive/reasonable act performed for the purposes of self-preservation.

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11
Q

Miller [1983] HOL

A

D, a squatter, was smoking in bed when he fell asleep. He awoke and saw that the cigarette had started a small fire. . He went into another room to sleep and the fire took hold. The house was seriously damaged.

HOL PRECEDENCE Diplock Held: said that you can look at the whole course of conduct. Where you accidentally create a dangerous state of affairs, that conduct can include failing to take reasonable steps to counter the danger. The defendant had created a dangerous situation and owed a duty to call the fire brigade upon becoming aware of the fire. He was therefore liable for his omission to do so.

Duty “to take measures that lie within one’s power to counteract a danger that one has oneself created”.. (per Lord Diplock)

Created a subjective test requiring defendants themselves to have realised
that they had created a dangerous situation before imposing a duty to act.

Evans created an objective test.

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12
Q

Actus reus

A

1) Conduct
2) Circumstances
3) Results

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13
Q

There is 4 types of conduct

A

1) Act
2) Omission
3) Possession
4) State of affairs

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14
Q

Yuen Kun-Yea v A-G of Hong Kong

A

Per Lord keith

there is no liability in negligence where one person sees another about to walk off a cliff, even where he shouts a warning. The law is only willing to impose liability for omissions in special cases where the reasons in favour are strong enough to override that aversion.

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15
Q

Evans [2009] EWCA.

A

adult children do not owe such duties to their half-sisters, even if living in the same house and where the half-sister is a minor:

the Court of Appeal laid down an objective test which
would be satisfied if defendants ought to have realised that they had created a dangerous
situation.

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16
Q

: R v Hood:

A

D omitted to summon held for three weeks after his wife fell and suffered broken bones. She died as a result. D was charged with manslaughter on the basis of his omission and his familial duty to assist.

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17
Q

Curtis

A

: Duties imposed on persons assuming a particular responsibility (Contractual responsibility)
Relationship between doctor and patent:

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18
Q

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland

A

A doctor may withdraw care, with judicial approval from a patient in a PVS

Ordinarily patient/doctor duty to act : curtis

But this was an exception.

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19
Q

Dytham COA

A

D, a police officer, failed to intervene in an incident where V was killed to death by a nightclub bouncer 30 yards away. Held: guilty of misconduct in public office.

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20
Q

Pittwood

A

D had been employed by a railway company to keep the gate at a level crossing. He went to lunch forgetting to close the gate. A haycart subsequently entered the crossing and was struck by a train. D was convicted of manslaughter.

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21
Q

Nicholls

A

D, V’s grandmother, agreed to take care of V after the death of V’s mother. V was neglected by D and died. D was charged with gross negligence manslaughter based on the duty rising from assumption of care.

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22
Q

Instan

A

D, V’s niece, moved into V’s house. V became extremely unwell and was unable to look after herself. However, although D continued to live in the house and eat V’s food, she did not care for V or summon help. V died, D was charged with gross negligence manslaughter based on the duty arising from an implicit assumption of care.

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23
Q

Stone and Dobinson

A

D tried ineffectively to assist V before her death, suggests that an assumption of care can arise even where D’s initial attempts to help V are relatively minor and of little affect.

The courts did not properly address the question of whether the test was what was reasonable for the subjective person or what was reasonable for a competent person? In this case, The defendants were held liable for gross negligence manslaughter even though they were of low IQ, suggesting that the test is one of what a reasonable person would do. However, in a problem question similar, highlight the fact that the issue was not directly addressed by the courts and that the unfairness it entails will lead to a future court to adopt a different approach.

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24
Q

Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commission

A

accidently drove on foot, he then refused to move the car. He was convicted of assault on the basis that his refusal to move the car amounted to a positive act of battery and was not a mere omission. Hence, it could satisfy the actus reus requirement.

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25
Q

Evans

A

D, V’s half-sister, supplied her with heroin which she self-administered. Realizing V showed symptoms of her overdose, D stayed with V but did not get help.
Held: step sister created the dangerous situation through the heroin she needed only call the ambulance.

Instead of miller subjective test, the Court of Appeal laid down an objective test which
would be satisfied if defendants ought to have realised that they had created a dangerous
situation.

Extended the principle.

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26
Q

Hensler

A

D sent V a letter begging for money misrepresenting his need. V was not deceived but nevertheless sent money. Held: D could not be convicted of obtaining by false pretenses, because the false pretense did not cause D to send the money.

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27
Q

White

A

D put poison in his mother’s (V) drink intending to kill her. V drank some of the poison and died. However, medical evidence demonstrated that V died due to a heart condition, not because of the poison. Held: Court of Criminal Appeal held that D was not guilty of murder but was guilty of attempted murder.

In White, D had completed acts capable of causing death (conduct element), death came about (result) but liability for murder failed because of the lack of causation linking D’s conduct with the result. D was not the factual cause of death.

1) Accelerated the result: As long as D’s conduct caused the result to come about when it did, she is the factual cause; it is irrelevant if it would have come about later without D’s involvement. This rule holds logic, particularly in homicide cases: as we all die at some point, D can never do more than speed up the process.
2) More than one cause: As long as the result would not have happened but for D’s conduct, it is not necessary to show that D was the only cause.
a. Benge: D misread a train timetable when taking up sections of a track. A train arrived and V was killed. D contended that death could have been avoided if his flagman had placed themselves at the proper distance from the worksite, and also if the train driver had kept a look out. Held: guilt of gross negligence.
b. In Benge, it may have been that other actors were also but for causes of V’s death, and may have been independently liable for it, but this does not undermine the fact that D was a But For cause as well.

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28
Q

Dolloway

A

– D was driving a horse and cart on the highway, whilst negligently allowing the reins to lie on the horse’s back rather than keeping control of them. V ran into the road and was killed. Even if D had control of the reigns, he could not have stopped in time to save V. Held: not guilty of gross negligence manslaughter.
In this case, D’s conduct was blameworthy, he was the factual cause of the death. However, his blameworthy conduct was not the cause of the death. V would have died either way.

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29
Q

Hughes (Supreme Court) –

A

D (Driving without insurance and a full license) was involved in a fatal collision with V. V was entirely responsible for the accident, veering onto the wrong side of the road whilst under influence of drugs. Held: Offence requires more than minimal fault/blameworthiness causing the result.

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30
Q

Hart COA

A

D assaulted V, leaving her lying unconscious on the beach below the high watermark. V was subsequently drowned by the incoming tide. Held: COA held that D was the cause of the death of the victim.
D would not have killed her if there was a freak wave that arrived.

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31
Q

Master COA

A

a. D inflicted a number of stab wounds upon V, aggravating an existing condition. V then died. D was convicted of murder.

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32
Q

Roberts

A

– D, driving V home after a party, began making unwanted sexual advances towards her, threatening her. V jumped out of the moving car and suffered actual bodily harm. D was found guilty of offences against the person act. COA.

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33
Q

People v Lewis

A

D shot V. A short time later, V cut his own throat with a knife. V died almost instantly. D was charged with manslaughter. At trial, medical experts testified that the gunshot wound to V’ abdomen would have resulted in death approximately an hour after D fired the shot, but that the knife wound was the immediate cause of death. D was convicted and he appealed.

34
Q

Kennedy (No2) HOL

A

D supplied V with heroin. V self-injected the drug and died. HOL held: D was not guilty because he was not the legal cause of V’s death. MUST MENTION THE (NO2) Bit. This set precedent that an informed and voluntary at will break the chain of causation.

35
Q

Blaue

A

D stabbed V, V required blood transfusion to save her life, but refused on religious grounds (being a Jehovah’s witness). V died and D was charged with manslaughter.

36
Q

Dear

A

D’s conviction for murder was upheld where V intentionally aggravated his wounds that had been inflicted by D.

the judge correctly directed the jury, “whether the injuries inflicted by the defendant were an operating and significant cause of the death”. It is immaterial whether some other cause was also operating.

The correct approach in the criminal law is that enunciated in Smith + hogan and the other authorities to which we have referred: were the injuries inflicted by the defendant an operating and significant cause of death?

Smith and hogen approach:
(ii) If a wound was an operating and substantial cause of death, the defendant is guilty of homicide, however badly the wound was treated. (3) If a wound was not an operating and substantial case of death (ie, it was effectively healed) but the victim was killed by, eg, the inadvertent admission of deadly poison by a nurse, the wrongful administration of terremycin, or the ill-treatment of a tracheotomy, the defendant may or may not be guilty of homicide.”

37
Q

Michael

A

a. D wished to murder her illegitimate child who was in the case of a foster-mother. She gave a bottle of poison to the foster mother, she did not administer the medicine, but her 5 year old child did. D was convicted of murder.

38
Q

Paggett

A

a. D emerged firing at police using his hostage as a human shield. The police returned fire in the dark, killing the hostage. It was foreseeable that the police would shoot back, they did killing the hostage (it was dark so they didn’t know he was using a hostage). It was said that the polices reaction was “involuntary”. But it need not be involuntary, it was enough that the reaction was a reasonable response.

39
Q

Benge (1865)

A

Negligently failed to follow safety procedures, this resulted in two workers being killed by a train. Benge argued that the train driver was also in the wrong. Held: even if this was true, it does not exclude the defendant as his contribution was more than minimal.

40
Q

R v Jordan (1956)

A

D stabbed V. At hospital, at a stage when V was largely healed, X (a doctor) administered a large quantity of a drug to which V had shown he was intolerant. It killed him. Held: X’s acts broke the chain of causation such that D was not the legal cause of death. Grossly negligent medical treatment broke the casual link between the stabbing and V’s death. “palpably wrong” treatment will break chain.

41
Q

Smith (1959)

A

D stabbed V in a fight between soldiers. When carrying V to medical reception, X dropped him twice. Y (a doctor) failed to note that the wound had pierced a lung and provided treatment later described as ‘thoroughly bad’.

D was charged with manslaughter. Lord Parker said that where the original injury is still “substantial” then regardless of contributing causes, the death can still be attributed to the defendant. It is only if the original wound is merely a historical setting for the second injury, which is then the major operating cause of death that there can be a break in the causal chain.

42
Q

Kirikiri (New Zealand case)

A
  1. V died due to accident by T. It was D fault that she died because the procedure was a medically appropriate response.
43
Q

Cheshire COA

A

a. D shot V. In hospital, V was treated and the wounds ceased to be life threatening. However, following a negligently performed operation by a doctor (X), V’s windpipe narrowed and he died. D was charged with murder.

44
Q

Pagett COA

A

a. D tried to resist arrest, holding V in front of him as a human shield and shot at police (x). X returned fire and killed V because they couldn’t see V. D was charged with manslaughter.
b. This was probably decided on policy grounds. In addition, they found that X’s actions were involuntary.

45
Q

Empress Car Co (HOL)

A

a. D a company, allowed oil to be stored on its site and failed to take precautions to prevent the foreseeable danger that someone would release it into the river. X released the oil. HOL held: D was charged with offences relating to pollution.
b. Despite free and voluntary act of third party, the chain of causation was not broken. HOL in Kennedy (No2) has since clarified that the Empress Cars precedent is isolated to pollution cases alone.

46
Q

Williams

A

i. W lacked both insurance and license. He was otherwise driving lawfully and within speed limit, but then V stepped in front of his car. W was unable to stop in time and W was killed.

47
Q

Hughes

A

i. H was uninsured and was driving safely. V was driving in opposite direction an opposite side of road due to drugs. V collided with H and died.

48
Q

Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1(1)

A

‘A person who, without lawful excuse, destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless (mens rea) as to whether such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence’.

49
Q

Mitchell[1983]

A

Reflex actions, spasms or other action outside of D’s control will not make him liable.

D hit A, who then collided with B who died. Held: B’s injuries were attributable to D.

50
Q

White [1910]

A

more than minimal’ contribution

defendant decided to poison mother for money, she died, but she had not touched the drink, she died of natural causes so there was no factual link at all. But For his actions, she would still have died. Held: he was tried for attempted murder and was convicted.

51
Q

Lord Hughes Hughes

A

It is a “significant (or substantial) cause, in the sense that it is not de minimis or minimal”

52
Q

R v Hughes [2013]

A

the charge was of causing death by driving without licence/insurance (RTA 1988 s.3ZB. Strict liability

driving knew he had no insurance no license. His car hit a car even though his driving was perfect, the driver was killed. it was the other drivers fault, he could not have done anything.Supreme Court Held: D could not be convicted because of the requirement of causing death “by” driving. Hughes said it was not enough that the defendant was a But For cause, it is necessary that bringing in common law rules of causation, the defendant had to make a “more than minimal” contribution to have caused the accident, to be more than minimal, there has to be something wrong with the driving. To cause death requires more than a state of affairs, therefore to be convicted under section 3ZB, Hughes’ driving must have been at fault in some way; it was not.

53
Q

Dalloway (1847)

A

The driver does not have proper control of the horses reins. A child runs into the road and is killed by the kart, the jury was told whether it made a different if the defendant was able to use the reins, if so, he would be guilty of manslaughter by negligence if not, he is not.

54
Q

Taylor [2016]

A

Hughes was approved

55
Q

McKechnie (1992)

A

Indirect cause

Inflicted head injuries on victim, victim was then found to have an ulcer which required surgery. However, the doctors could not do the surgery because the injuries inflicted by D made it unsafe to use a general anaesthetic. Held: the defendant was a cause of the death, the inability to operate was an indirect cause of death but that was in consequence of the defendants actions.

“[was] the omission to operate, which was a cause of death, …in turn a consequence of D’s actions in inflicting the head injuries upon V?” (Simester & Sullivan).

56
Q

Dyson [1908]

A

Defendant injured a child.

Lord Alverston said “the proper question to have been submitted to the jury was whether the prisoner accelerated the child’s death by the injuries which he inflicted”.

57
Q

Common law duty to acts omissions

A

1) Contract
2) Medical treatment
3) Family relationship
4) Creation of a dangerous situation
5) Undertaking

58
Q

Gibbins & Proctor (1918)

A

G and P failed to feed the child and she died from starvation.

Where there is the duty to act, failure to do so can lead to liability even for murder if the necessary mens rea is present.

The woman was held to be liable because, while the child was not hers, she assumed responsibility as parent.

At common law a parent has a duty to act for the welfare of his child and, if harm is caused to the child by his failure to act, he may be criminally liable for the resulting harm

59
Q

Instan [1893]

A

D lived with aunt, aunt paid D to care for her, but when aunt fell ill, D failed to provide food or summon medical help, she then died. Held: convicted of manslaughter because expected that he would provide care in return for money, this was in addition to the family relationship. Here there was an undertaking

60
Q

Stone & Dobinson [1977]

A

S and D allowed an ill and unstable sister to live in their house; she died after they failed to call for medical attention when she did not eat and became ill. Held: both convicted of manslaughter, Stone was a relative. Dobinson was convicted because he had undertaken some duty by trying to feed and dress her

61
Q

Adomako [1995]

HL

A

– An anesetist was convicted of man slaughter when he failed to notices that his patient’s oxygen supply had become detached in an operation.

62
Q

Medical treatment supervening causes cases

A

Cheshire (1991): negligent treatment was so independent of his acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that they regard the contribution made by his acts as insignificant” (Beldam LJ)

Smith (1959)– chain broken if original injury is “only the setting in which another cause operates”

R v Jordan (1956)- Palpably wrong treatment will break chain.

More recent cases show less likely to break chain.

63
Q

Holland (1841)

A

Defendant wounded V’s hand, doctor said that the finger should be amputated because otherwise you can get an infection. However, V refused. D was cause of death.

64
Q

Dear [1996]

A

Defendant wounded victim, but victim then chose to die, either neglected wounds or even possibly reopened them. In either case D was cause of death.

65
Q

Supervening causes

A

1) Medical treatment
2) Victim refuses medical treatment
3) Victim is injured whilst escaping
4) Voluntary act of victim
5) Self-preservation triggered by D’s act

66
Q

Williams (1992)

A

Victimhad to jump out of moving car because defendant was trying to rob him and was killed. Stuart- Smith asked whether the response was “reasonable”?
reasonableness here was in the range of responses that might be expected from a victim in that situation, including characteristics of defendant and in the moment.

67
Q

Roberts (1971)

A

non-fatal accident, V hurt after jumping out of car to prevent sexual assault.

68
Q

Lewis [2010] EWCA

A

V ran into traffic to escape from threatened beating and was killed.
- Was the reaction of the victim “daft”?

69
Q

Victim refusing medical treatment supervening causes

A

1) Blaue
2) Holland
3) Dear

70
Q

Victim is injured whilst escaping supervening causes

A

1) Williams - was the response reasonable? reasonableness here was in the range of responses that might be expected from a victim in that situation, including characteristics of defendant and in the moment.
2) Roberts
3) Lewis - was the response daft?

71
Q

Voluntary act of victim: supervening causes

A

1) Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] UKHL - V has to be volunatary and have an informed decision to break the chain. “a fully-informed and responsible adult breaks chain of causation (Bingham)
2) Dhaliwal (2006)

72
Q

Dhaliwal (2006)

CoA

A

The defendant had verbally abused his wife for many years
The wife committed suicide as a result of this abuse. Held: not guilty because The defendant’s wife did not commit suicide as an immediate and reasonable response to the verbal abuse, but acted voluntarily.

the prosecution case depended on the submission that psychological injury without any recognised psychiatric illness was capable of constituting ‘bodily harm’ within the meaning of ss 18, 20 and 47 of the 1861 Act. THERE WAS NO RECOGNISED PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS.

73
Q

Pagett (1983)

A

D fired a gun at police officers from a darkened landing. The police officers fire back, what they can’t see is that Pagett is using his pregnant girlfriend as a shield, the police fire kills the girlfriend. Held: the polices shooting was a response to D’s shooting, it was not truly voluntary.

74
Q

Third parties can break chain of causation

A

1) Pagett

2) Empress Cars v National Rivers Authority (1999) HOL

75
Q

Poulton (1832)

A

An unborn baby, or a baby in process of being born, is not a “reasonable creature” so no offence
Baby must be expelled alive before it is a victim. But the baby has some protection, such a child destruction.

76
Q

A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994)

A

The defendant stabbed his pregnant girlfriend, she went into labour prematurely, the baby was born alive but then died due to complications that could be linked back to the stabbing. The appellant’s actions could not amount to murder. However, his actions could amount to constructive manslaughter.

77
Q

Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins) [2000

A

Once a seriously handicapped child is born alive, it is as much entitled to the protection of the criminal law as any other human being’ (per Brooke)

78
Q

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland

A

Man in a PVS which there was no return, HoL decided that it was lawful for the doctors to decide not to treat the patient any future. But it is not lawful to kill him, cannot take active steps to terminate life.

79
Q

Mitchell

A

Defendant hit person A, A then collided with B, B later died. Held: B’s injuries were attributed to D and not A

80
Q

Miller principle extended

A

Evans
DPP v Santana-Bermudez

Miller principle extended in DPP v Santana-Bermudez because original conduct was advertent and there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to another. D failed to inform an officer searching D’s pockets that there were exposed syringes in the pockets.